Abstract
capabilities of digital CATV systems. The OpenCable reference diagram defines and has a set of headend interfaces (OCI-H1, OCI-2, and OCI-3), the network interface (OCI-N), the consumer interface (OCI-C1), and the security module interface (OCI-C2), as shown in Fig. 1 [1] . The importance of the OpenCable reference diagram is that it specifies a number of standard interfaces among a variety of components within the cable system. By specifying these interfaces, it is possible to replace certain components with others without redesigning the entire system [1] .
In particular, as shown in Fig. 1 , the OCI-C2 interface provides the interface to a Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module for digital signals or contents provided over the cable system. The POD security module is a Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) format device supplied by the cable operator, and provides two important functions in the separation of the security and in signaling support [1] . In addition, as shown in Fig. 1 , the OCI-H2 interface provides separation of the conditional access function from the rest of the headend functions. This interface is the headend equivalent of the OCI-C2 interface of the OpenCable device. In both cases, the security function must remain as secure as possible and relies on shared information in the headend Conditional Access System (CAS) and the POD security module. The definition of the OCI-H2 and OCI-C2 interfaces must provide two important functions for the CAS upgrade and replacement [1] .
The OpenCable system consists of a wide variety of key components, such as the STB and the POD security module, and key interfaces at the headend and the network edge in a home environment. These components will be described, along with the consensus-building of the OpenCable process, which should be used to define the industry standards for modern CATV networks [1] . The goal of the process required by the OpenCable specification is to define a new generation of CATV terminal devices that are interoperable across other cable network systems [2] . The OpenCable specification supports integrated environments, openness, interoperability, portability, and a renewable and replaceable core encryption system. The OpenCable system also supports a migration path from uni-directional to bi-directional cable signaling on networks and from broadcast to real-time interactive applications via cable networks [1] .
In this paper, in order to research and develop the proposed Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module, system technical domain processes are introduced along with their relationship to the products that enable the creation of a POD security module. The processes describe the varying influence of the domain in which systems engineering is conducted throughout a system's life-time. In addition, they illustrate how four distinct and mutually interdependent domains within the systems engineering business processes each contain a lifecycle that contributes to the overall life-cycle of the system. In addition, we propose the new OpenCable reference model and implement a Conditional Access System (CAS). We have also designed the hardware architecture of the OpenCable Set-Top Box (STB) and the POD security module [3] and have tested the modeled and designed system using a prototype board.
II. CONTENTS PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN

A. OCI-H2 Reference Architecture
The OCI-H2 interface provides the separation of the conditional access function from the rest of the headend functions. This interface is the headend equivalent of the OCI-C2 interface at the OpenCable device. In both cases, the security function must remain as secure as possible and relies on shared information in the headend Conditional Access System (CAS) and the Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module. The goal of the OCI-H2 interface is to define a standard interface that supports the separation of conditional access functions from service delivery functions. By separating these, the OCI-H2 interface provides the option of supporting multiple CASs within a single cable system. This mode is referred to as a 'SimulCrypt' operation [1] . Fig. 2 illustrates one approach to separate the conditional access functions based on the European Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) SimulCrypt model. The main difference is the delivery of the Entitlement Management Messages (EMMs), which are sent to the OpenCable device via an Outof-Band (OOB) channel rather than In-Band (IB), as described by DVB. Fig. 2 shows an example of a SimuCrypt operation, in which two CASs can be simultaneously encrypted. In this arrangement, the MPEG-2 multi-program transport system is encrypted and sent once to all OpenCable devices using an agreed common encryption algorithm [1] .
The OpenCable system works by sharing a single key generator --a source of random 'working keys' that are used to encrypt the MPEG-2 transport stream (TS). In practice, different working keys are used to encrypt each service. The working key is also sent to the CAS(s). The job of the CAS is to authorize each customer for those services for which he has paid. Sending an encrypted working key in an IB Entitlement Control Message (ECM) achieves this. The ECMs are sent IB so that they can be changed frequently to increase security and so that they can quickly be acquired if the channel is changed.
In Fig. 2 , each CAS sends its own ECM stream to an MPEG-2 multiplexer for insertion periodically (usually about 10 times per second) in the multi-program TS. The CAS also sends EMMs to the OpenCable device via the OOB channel. The EMM contains the key that the OpenCable device uses to decrypt the ECMs and provide access to a service [1] .
B. OCI-C2 Reference Architecture
Several approaches exist for the separation of security. Most advanced digital Set-Top Boxes (STBs) use smart cards with ISO/IEC 7816-3 interface, which allow replacement of the secure microprocessor component of the Conditional Access System (CAS). However, the smart card does not allow complete replacement of the security system because the actual decryption of the signal still resides in the digital STB [1] , [2] .
A new approach is to encapsulate conditional access and security functions in a replaceable Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module and to standardize the POD security module interface as shown in Fig. 3 . In this way, the security system can be upgraded or replaced over time without impacting the host. This replaceable module adopts the Type II PC Card format defined by the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) [1] , [2] . The interface of the PC Card is more robust and flexible than the smart card. The PC Card connector has 68-pin and the module is shielded. The module is thicker than the smart card and supports a metallic casing that provides better heat dissipation. Although the module has these technical advantages over the smart card, it is also likely to be more expensive. To mitigate this, the module can accept a smart card, allowing security upgrades without replacement of the entire module, as shown in Fig. 4 [1]- [3] . Fig. 1 is the OpenCable reference model diagram. The OCI-C2 interface is defined between the OpenCable device and the POD security module. The host is responsible for all functions except conditional access. There are many different host devices with a wide range of functions and capabilities. The POD security module is a replaceable component that is provided by the cable operator and provides all the security functions required by the cable CAS [1] , [2] .
C. POD Security Module Architecture
The design of the Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module varies from a general implementation to the proposed implementation in this paper. Fig. 4 (a) and 4(b) show the proposed POD security module design in this paper. Although the POD security module separates the security functions into a replaceable module, the system operation is identical to the integrated Set-Top Box (STB) [1] [2] [3] .
The MPEG-2 multi-program Transport Stream (TS) enters the POD security module via the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) connector and is de-multiplexed into its component Program Elementary Streams (PESs). The selected Program Identification Numbers (PIDs) are then filtered and sent to the payload decryption engine. In addition, the Entitlement Control Messages (ECMs) are sent to the secure and replaceable microprocessor, shown in Fig. 4 (a) and 4(b), where they are decrypted and fed to the payload decryption engine. After the payload is decrypted, it is fed into the copy protection engine, which encrypts the protected contents. As shown in Fig. 4 (a) and 4(b), the same secure and replaceable microprocessor that supports conditional access functions generates the encryption keys for contents encryption. The final payload is re-multiplexed into an MPEG-2 multi-program transport stream and leaves the POD security module via the PCMCIA connector [1] [2] [3] .
The Out-of-Band (OOB) data enters the POD security module via the PCMCIA connector and arrives at the OOB processing circuit. This block contains data link and media access control functions and provides the OOB communications processing for the POD security module. Messages from the OOB processing circuit arrive at the Central Processing Unit (CPU). The CPU controls and coordinates all POD security module functions by executing applications stored in FLASH memory. The command interface allows messages to be exchanged between the host and the POD security module by reading and writing the locations in Random-Access Memory (RAM) [1] , [2] .
D. Contents Protection System
The Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module interface support a sophisticated Contents Protection System (CPS) that encrypts the MPEG-2 payload. The CPS authenticates the host device and allows revocation of service to fraudulent hosts. The POD security module interface is one link in the contents distribution chain from the contents provider to the consumer. Fig. 5 illustrates the path of the MPEG-2 payload from the headend via the cable network to the host [1] , [3] .
The CPS prevents unauthorized copying of the MPEG payload when it is exposed at any interface in the contents distribution chain. In all exposed interfaces (i.e., OCI-N, OCI-C2, and OCI-C1), the digital payload is encrypted to prevent unauthorized copying, but is present in a clear text form within devices. The POD CPS is very similar in operation to a Conditional Access System (CAS). The POD security module interface copy protection include several steps [1] :
1) Host Authentication
The POD security module authenticates the host before it releases any payload over the OCI-C2 interface. Each host contains a restricted authentication device certificate that is digitally signed. The POD security module verifies that the host certificate is valid before it binds with the host.
2) Host Certificate Reporting
The POD security module sends the host's device certificate to the headend when it binds with the host where it is stored in a database.
3) Modified Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
The POD security module and the host exchange random numbers to generate a shared secret key. This key is refreshed periodically to reduce the system's vulnerability to brute-force key search attacks.
4) Payload Encryption
The POD security module encrypts the MPEG-2 payload using a standard 56-bit DES algorithm. The POD security module uses a session key (derived from the shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman exchange) to encrypt the payload.
5) Authentication of Copy Control Information
The Copy Control Information (CCI) is sent to the POD security module, protected by the CAS. The POD security module sends the CCI message, in the clear, to the host across the data channel. CCI authentication is achieved using information contained in the CCI message to compute the derived session key.
III. CONTENTS PROTECTION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
A. POD Security Module with PCMCIA Interface
In this study, we have proposed an OpenCable reference model merged with the smart card interface defined by ISO/IEC 7816-3 and have implemented a new Conditional Access System (CAS) using that interface along with the PCMCIA interface [3] . In addition, we have also designed the hardware architecture of the Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module using the above two interfaces [3] .
In the digital Set-Top Box (STB), the conditional access to protect the multimedia contents is achieved using digital encryption to scramble the MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS). The MPEG-2 payload decryption engine is responsible for deciphering the MPEG-2 payload. Therefore, the POD security module should provide the key component of the CAS and also provide a number of important functions.
The OCI-C2 interface is related to security since it transfers programming contents across a digital interface and supports a Contents Protection System (CPS) to prevent any illegal copying. The OCI-C2 interface is also defined as being between the OpenCable device and security module, such as POD security module [4] . The host system should be responsible for all functions except conditional access while the POD security module should provide all the security functions required by the OpenCable CAS. Our designed and developed host system is a CAS and Outof-Band (OOB) communication system [5] , as shown in Fig. 1 . Our main system is supported by two-way broadband operations (OOB process) for SCTE/DVS 178 using forward communication (2.048Mbps) and reverse communication (256Kbps) Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) modems as shown in Fig. 3 [5] .
B. POD Security Module with PCMCIA and ISO/IEC 7816-3 Interfaces
In general, the most common method of updating security information for the Set-Top Box (STB) is achieved by inserting a smart card into a slot of the STB. When the smart card is inserted into a slot in the STB, the card co-operates with the embedded secure microprocessor of the Conditional Access System (CAS). The function of security co-operation with the STB should also support flexible and portability, whose ability is related to move the STB from one system to another [1] .
To date, several approaches exist in the separation of security functions. The Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module, including a smart card terminal, supports the communication protocol to the smart card, whose protocol is described by ISO/IEC 7816-3 [6] . Most advanced digital STB's use smart cards, which allow partial co-operation with the secure microprocessor component of the CAS [1] .
However, the smart card does not allow complete cooperation with the security system, since the actual decryption of the signal still resides in the digital STB. Therefore, we adopted the Type II PC Card format defined by the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) [7] . The interface of the PCMCIA is more robust and flexible than that of smart card defined by ISO/IEC 7816-3 [8] . In addition, the PCMCIA connector has 68-pin and its module is shielded to prevent damage from the external attacks [8] .
In our proposed system, the POD security module has been designed to accept a smart card, which will allow for security information upgrades, with complete co-operation with the module, as shown in Fig. 4 . Subscribers need to insert their smart cards into the designed POD security module system for conditional access services, for both commercial and copyrighted contents [3] .
This system can also issue smart cards for conditional services and can manage all the subscribers' records for the contents stored on their smart cards. This study focused on the conditional access mechanism using a smart card that is able to provide pay TV services within the OpenCable system [3] .
C. In-Band Processor for the POD Security Module
We have proposed a new effective Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module architecture and designed the module needed. In our system, the POD security module has an embedded 32-bit Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) microprocessor (i.e., ARM7TDMI), which manages the applications and communications with the included peripherals (i.e., AMBA, AHB, APB, MPEG-2 filter, descrambler, copy protector, PC Card interface, and Smart Card Interface (SCI)) [2] , as shown in Fig. 6 .
The same secure microprocessor that supports conditional access functions generates the encryption keys for contents encryption. The final MPEG-2 payload is re-multiplexed into an MPEG-2 multi-program Transport Stream (TS) and leaves the POD security module via the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) connector [1] , [3] .
As shown in Fig. 6 , the Central Processing Unit (CPU) controls and coordinates all POD security module functions by executing applications stored in FLASH memory. The command interface allows messages to be exchanged between the host and the POD security module by reading and writing locations in Random-Access Memory (RAM) [9] - [10] .
D. Out-of-Band Processor for the POD Security Module 1) DES Cipher Block Chaining
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) packet encryption permits the encryption and decryption of packet data such as audio, video, or data. This is performed using DES Cipher Block Chaining (CBC). Fig. 7 shows basic DES-CBC. The whitener is a fixed or programmable 64-bit random value. The Control Word (CW) is a fixed or programmed value [11] .
Note the exception handling of small blocks of data less than 8 bytes, such as might occur with a packet payload of an odd length not equal to an integer number of 8 byte blocks. This is called 'termination block processing.' This is not encryption of packet data, but Exclusive OR (XOR) of packet data with a quantity generated by encryption. It is similar to output feedback processing in that regard, in that the encoder and decoder form identical quantities to XOR on the packet data [11] . This differs from non-termination block CBC, where packet data is encrypted at the encoder and decrypted at the decoder. The DES operation for this mode is encryption in both encoder and decoder, not decrypt in one and encrypt in the other. This is the special case when there is not an integer number of 8-byte blocks, but rather the final (termination) block of data is less than 8 bytes [11] .
An MPEG-2 packet can have an adaptation header that can allow arbitrary amounts of undefined information to be part of a packet header, which may result in a very small actual data payload that could be less than 8 bytes. This special case could result in the termination block of less than 8 bytes being the only data in the packet --the termination block would be the first and last block in that case [11] .
2) DVB Common Scrambling Algorithm Two things were considered for the functional operation of the Conditional Access System (CAS) processor. We have analyzed the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA) and the scrambling technology of the DVB CAS. Based on this specification analysis, the descrambler has been designed with the Verilog Hardware Description Language (HDL) [3] .
Digital encryption is used to scramble the MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS) in a general digital Set-Top Box (STB). The MPEG-2 payload decryption is responsible for deciphering the scrambled MPEG-2 TS. The scrambling mechanism of the DVB involves two ciphers, a block cipher and a stream cipher. The block cipher works in a reverse cipher block changing mode with block units and the stream cipher works like a pseudo-random byte generator [12] , [13] .
Both are designed so as to not be independently operated. The stream cipher protects the block cipher from attack. The entire mechanism is much more firm than when each ciphers works independently. According to these characteristics, the super descrambling operation is constructed in the hardware as shown in Fig. 8 [3] .
3) DES Electronic Code Book
We have analyzed the 'OpenCable HOST-POD Interface Specification' and 'OpenCable POD Copy Protection System' for copy protection. In accordance with the analyses results, we have designed an encryption module in DES Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode with HDL [4] . We then constructed a smart card interface according to ISO/IEC 7816-3 and the interface for Out-of-Band (OOB) communication has been verified [3] . Finally the MPEG-2 filter was designed for the ISO/IEC 13818-1 in HDL [14] .
IV. CONTENTS PROTECTION SYSTEM VERIFICATION
A. Construction of the Integrated Test Environments
In this study, we have constructed an integrated test environment to verify our developed system, which consists of a Conditional Access System (CAS) processor and an Out-ofBand (OOB) processor, belonging to the Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module for the OpenCable specification. According to integrated test environment of the POD security module, the MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS) bit stream is transferred from the MPEG-2 TS generator to host emulator, as shown in Fig. 9 [3] .
The host emulator is a Set-Top Box (STB) emulator, which then sends the MPEG-2 data to the POD security module through a Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) interface using both an In-Band (IB) and OOB channel. The POD security module then processes the MPEG-2 data by descrambling it and providing copy protection [3] .
The processed MPEG-2 TS bit stream is then transferred from the POD security module to the host emulator though PCMCIA connector. Finally the video and audio data decoded by STB (host emulator) is transmitted to the users (subscribers) through a TV (screen and speaker) [3] .
B. Operation Procedures of the POD Security Module
In our proposed system's operational processes, just after the system is turned on, the Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module starts with the management of the Program Specific Information (PSI) and the additional service information Transport Stream (TS). The POD security module processes are related to the Program Association Table (PAT),  the Conditional Access Table (CAT), and the Program Map  Table ( PMT) in the MPEG-2 format [3] .
PAT provides the correspondence between a Program Number (PN) and the Packet Identifier (PID) values of the PMT. The PID value of PAT is fixed to 0. The CAT provides the PID value of the Entitlement Management Messages (EMMs). The PID value of CAT is fixed to 1. The PMT provides the mapping between the PN and program elements and provides the PID value of the Entitlement Control Message (ECM) [3] .
The POD security module receives the EMM from the Outof-Band (OOB) channel. The EMMs are encrypted and the secure microprocessor decrypts them to recover the session key. The POD security module also decrypts each ECM using the session key to recover the working key. The working key should then be sent to the MPEG-2 payload decryption engine, after which it is fabricated using a semiconductor manufacturing process that makes it difficult to analyze the program and the data contained within. This security should be essential for the above reason [3] .
As shown in Fig. 10 , the flow chart shows data parsing or filtering for the MPEG-2 TS packet header. Firstly, after the TS packet enters the MPEG-2 system, the system finds the packets with a PID of 0 and analyzes the packets. The PID=0 packets, called PAT, provide the PID information of Program Management Message (PMM), Receiver Command Message (RCM), and PMT sessions. The system assigns a PN of 0 and 1 to the PMM and RCM, respectively. All TSs should include a completely valid PAT, because the PAT connects the PN and the PMT_PID, which is the PID of TS packet defining each valid program.
After the MPEG-2 filter analyzes the PAT, the filter can get the PN and its PID from the PAT. In this process, PN=0 is assigned to the network PID. And a value of PN=1 is also assigned to RCM_PID in typical digital broadcasting systems. Operators at the headend can use other numbers except 0 and 1 (i.e., all numbers except 0 and 1).
In this case, the PN used in the MPEG-2 system is assigned to the program map PID. Therefore we can obtain the PMT, PN=X, and PID=PX. If the MPEG-2 filter is analyzing the PMT using the above procedure, we can obtain the PIDs of the video, audio, and private data at the ECM. As well, each header is filtered. The filtered video and audio payloads are then transmitted to descrambler and the ECM makes a working key using the session key from EMM that is processed in the OOB processor, and this working key is transferred to the descrambler [14] .
C. Copy Protection and Authentication
The specification of the 'OpenCable POD Copy Protection System' defines the measures to protect the highly valued contents and the connection between the Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module and the host device [4] . The program provider demands a guarantee of a stable system from the headend to the home of the end-user. The cable Set-Top Box (STB) use copy protection technology to secure the digital/analog output of the customers [15] .
Depending upon the use of the POD security module, it is needed to block any unauthorized search for communication at the HOST-POD. Basically, the POD security module has to decipher an encryption of service as a control of the headend, and encrypt useful data to protect information from pirating [4] .
1) Authentication Key Generation
The basic key negotiation process for POD copy protection is shown in Fig. 11 . During the host authentication process, Diffie-Hellman (DH) public keys are exchanged between the POD security module and the host as a conventional part of the DH protocol. DH public keys along with the IDs are used to derive the authentication keys, which authenticate the DH exchange and resist 'Man in the Middle' attacks [4] .
Both the POD security module and the host calculate a 160-bit value called the authentication key. The authentication key is calculated based on the 64-bit POD security module ID, and the 40-bit host ID, and the shared Diffie-Hellman Secret Key (DHSK). POD security module, where the POD security module compares it against the one it calculated from the same information. The POD security module proceeds with authentication if and only if its internally calculated version of the authentication key is identical to the one it obtains from the host [4] . The authentication key generation need occur only once (per HOST-POD pair) when the POD security module and the host are first connected. The resulting values of two authentication keys and DHSK then need to be stored in non-volatile memory, and are used to generate transmission keys later in the key derivation step [4] .
2) Copy Protection Key Generation
Highly randomized variables are used as new random numbers (nonces). Random nonces along with IDs are exchanged between the POD security module and the host interface. A common copy protection key between the POD security module and the host is derived from these newly exchanged random numbers, the authentication key and the 1024-bit shared DH secret key. The derived common copy protection key is then used to encrypt/decrypt MPEG-2 packets sent from the POD security module to the host [4] .
To generate contents encryption and decryption key in POD Copy Protection System (CPS), a single key generation procedure is used. In addition to the long-term authentication key and the shared DHSK derived from the host authentication process, new random numbers are generated and included as a nonce in the key generation [4] .
3) Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm
The DH public key agreement algorithm provides a method for the POD security module and the host to compute a long term shared secret that is used in the contents encryption/decryption key generation. The DH protocol provides the system with a cryptographic property known as 'perfect forward secrecy.' Fig. 12 illustrates the DH operations conducted in the POD security module and the host, and interface between them [4] .
4) SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm
The 'OpenCable POD Copy Protection System' specification employs the RSA signature algorithm with SHA-1 for all X.509 digital certificates. The specification uses 65537 as the public exponent for its signing operation. The CableLabs device root Certification Authority (CA) shall employ a modulus length of 2048-bit for signing the manufacturer CA certificates it issues. Manufacturer CA certificates must employ signature key modulus lengths of 2048-bit for signing the device certificates. The device certificates shall employ a modulus length of 1024-bit for POD security module and the host devices [4] .
V. CONCLUSIONS
The proposed system adopted a Data Encryption Standard (DES) Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), a Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA), and a DES Electronic Code Book (ECB) as a scrambler and de-scrambler for conditional access services. In addition, the system has also uses a data encryption, performed by the DES algorithm, a Dynamic Feedback Arrangement Scrambling Technique (DFAST) key-stream generator, and a DiffieHellman (DH) key exchange algorithm, for contents protection.
This study proposes conditional access flow using a subscriber smart card. This conditional access mechanism can be used as a reference of the digital Cable Television (CATV) system or other digital services system, while defining additional messages between the Set-Top Box (STB), with the Point-of-Deployment (POD) security module, and the subscriber smart card, can easily extend this algorithm.
The OpenCable system has adopted an MPEG-2 payload descrambling process, for the MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS), and data encryption, using a DES algorithm, for contents protection. This study presents a new design and implementation of the POD security module that is based on the OpenCable specifications.
We have also constructed an integrated test environment to verify our developed system. Using this test environment, we should be able to check all the operations of the In-Band (IB) processor and Out-of-Band (OOB) processor, as well as the STB. The correct operations were achieved successfully on our test board, which also included some peripheral devices (i.e., ARM7, FPGA, FLASH, and RAM).
